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The adversary system is a foundational feature of our legal sys-
tem. Many of the activities in our legal system are overtly adver-
sarial, and virtually all of our public legal decisions are processed in
an adversarial fashion. The adversary premise also underlies all of
our law and our thinking about law. While the adversary system is
important, there has been relatively little study of this adversary sys-
tem premise.' This premise is a foundational axiom so embedded
in our thought processes and actions that we build on it without
questioning why we use this footing.
The use of an adversarial system to generate decisions about
* I would like to thank David Baldus, Florian Bartosic, Richard Delgado, Floyd
Feeney and Robert Hillman for their encouragement and comments on the first draft of
this article.
** Acting Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
1 The aim of this article is to articulate, elaborate and explore theories of American
adversary criminal trial, ultimately making the best case for our system. Many people
have mixed feelings about our adversary system, and yet are fascinated by it enough to
try to figure out why criminal cases are tried in the rather peculiar way they are.
In researching this topic, it becomes apparent that there are very few discussions of
the theory of adversariness. While a number of works discuss or critique the adversary
system or some of its features, few investigate the theory of the adversary system. In-
deed, most justifications proferred for the adversary system are simply rhetorical asser-
tions about its supposed merits. There are few works, however, that attempt to provide
explanations or analyses of how the adversary system achieves its claimed results.
The principal works that analyze the theory of the adversary system are: Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H. Berman ed. 1960); Luban, The Adver-
say System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Donagan,Jusifying Legal
Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER 123 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Schwartz,
The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER 150 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Damaska,
Structure of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
Most adversary system critiques assume that truth-finding is the purpose of the ad-
versary system and challenge it from that point of view. The principle critiques are: J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1950); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1978); Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Damaska, Evidentiary
Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 506 (1973).
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disputes is a large subject. This Article undertakes a more limited
inquiry. Adversariness of itself has little concrete meaning. There
is no generic type of adversary system; different societies use differ-
ent versions. The ancient Greeks and Romans each had adversarial
systems of public decision-making, but these systems were quite dif-
ferent from both the English adversary trial system and our own sys-
tem.2 Trial by physical battle is a type of adversarial system, as are
formal debate, presidential elections, football games, and a host of
similar events. What all of these events have in common is that they
are contests that lead to decisions. They can be distinguished, how-
ever, by the manner in which the contest is structured. This Article
addresses the question of why we structure our adversary criminal
trial contest the way we do.
II. DETERMINATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF
ADVERSARY TRIAL SYSTEMS
There are several determinative features of adversary trial sys-
tems. These features include: the roles of the judge and other deci-
sion-makers (active or passive); the role of the parties or party
representatives in controlling presentations; the manner in which
"facts" are proven; the obligations of the parties to one another;
and informational and decisional side constraints which directly or
indirectly skew final decision-making. 3 Adversary systems can be
compared on the basis of these determinate features, some of which
are intimately related, and on the ways the system fills and combines
these variables.
In the United States, there are two separate adversary systems,
a civil and a criminal system. Although these two systems have some
identical features, they differ structurally in the ways in which they
specify some of the variables described above. In general, the crimi-
nal adversary system operates under more numerous, and more
stringent, side constraints than does the civil system. The obliga-
tions between the parties also differ in the criminal and civil systems.
This Article focuses on the criminal system, leaving the civil system
and underlying relationship between the two systems to a later time.
2 See R. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS 167-96, 203-22
(1927);J. STRACHAN DAVIDSON, 2 PROBLEMS IN THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW 112-34 (1912);
A. GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURES OF CICERO'S TIME 471-504 (190 1); A. HARRISON,
THE LAW OF ATHENS 47-48, 156-67, 247-54 (1971); W. KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 66-74 (2d ed. 1973); D. MACDOWELL, THE
LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 242-47 (1978).
3 Cf. Damaska, The Adversary System, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24-29 (S.
Kadish ed. 1983).
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The American adversary criminal trial is a regulated storytelling
contest between champions of competing, interpretive stories that
are composed under significant restraints. The parties compose
their stories for and present them to an impartial and passive audi-
ence which acts as a decision-maker, by assigning criminal liability
on the basis of the stories.
4
The major structural features of American adversary criminal
trials are as follows. 5 "Facts" are "proven" dialectically through a
complex process of persuasion. This process takes the general form
of a dramatic contest aimed at shaping two mutually inconsistent
interpretations of common data. A decision-maker, paradigmati-
cally a jury composed of non-legally trained lay persons,6 assesses
the stories presented to it and assigns criminal liability. The parties,
almost always acting through attorneys, control and manage the
presentation of evidence-the materials from which "facts" are con-
structed. The parties and their attorneys are also attitudinally and
ethically committed to winning the contest rather than to some
other goal, such as discovery of truth or fairness to the opposing
side.
7
4 "Story telling" seems to be the most accurate description of the focus of the activi-
ties of each side in a criminal trial. See the enlightening study of W. BENNETT & M.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1985).
5 See supra note I for a list of sources.
6 If both the prosecution and defense waive the right to jury trial, a judge, sitting
alone, may hear and decide a criminal case. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
A jury trial, however, is central to the American system of adversary criminal trial.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). This article discusses only the jury trial
system.
7 If the truth is that his client committed the crime, the defense attorney's job is
to keep the truth from coming out, or to keep the jury from recognizing it if it does.
It is unethical to hold back any effort, to do the job with less than all one's "zeal".
J. KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER
30 (1983).
As a matter of constitutional law, the prosecution has a duty to disclose some evi-
dence to the defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976). Cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). The theory under-
lying this disclosure requirement is that the State's law enforcement interests are served
when both the guilty are convicted and the innocent are acquitted. The state therefore
has an obligation to ensure that trials are fair so that the innocent will not be convicted.
As agents of the state, prosecutors' duties include the duty not to use perjured testimony
knowingly, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213
(1942); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); to disclose on request evidence favorable
to the accused, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and, in some cases, to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused even when there has been no request for this informa-
tion, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
The defense has no reciprocal disclosure obligation. The above cited cases there-
fore, can be interpreted to suggest that the prosecution has an obligation to seek the
truth, but the defense does not. These cases, however, impose only limited disclosure
obligations and do little to affect the competitive ethos of prosecutors. Prosecutors do
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The parties have significantly unequal mutual disclosure obliga-
tions. The prosecution must present its story first, thus permitting
the defense an opportunity to assess the competing story and to ad-
just its own story accordingly. The prosecution does not have the
power to force the defending party to testify and thereby provide
the prosecution with material for its story. Additionally, the prose-
cution must satisfy an extraordinarily high burden of proof-beyond
a reasonable doubt-in order to prevail. Complex evidentiary rules
govern the material that may be incorporated into the parties' sto-
ries and the inferences the decision-maker should draw from the
material. Complicated legal instructions are presented to the jury in
order to focus and limit its decisional discretion.
III. THEORIES OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
What explanations does our legal system offer to account for
these features? The major explanations of adversary trial are that its
purpose is truth-finding; that it leads to fair decisions; that it pro-
tects the people from oppression or potential oppression by govern-
ment; that, as a stalemate system, it is conducive to bargaining; and
that finally it is a process designed to produce publicly acceptable
conclusions which project substantive legal norms, whether or not
those conclusions are grounded in true facts.
A. TRUTH-FINDING THEORY
The most common view of the purpose of the adversary system
is that in matters relating to human, as opposed to scientific, affairs
it is the best truth-finding system we can devise. This view is based
on claims that "[t]ruth is best discovered by powerful statements on
both sides of a question." The simplest formulation of this view
assumes that the principal issue of an adversary trial is to discover
"what happened," that is, historical fact, and that a competitive con-
test over what happened is the best way to accomplish this goal.
This view is easy to debunk as an unequivocal explanation of an
adversary criminal trial. Aside from trial lawyers and perhaps
judges, both of whom have economic and ideological investments in
not try cases as investigations aimed at discovering what happened; rather they try to
prove a theory of the case that they advance. In practice, prosecutors are as committed
to winning as defense counsel. Prosecutors, like the system as a whole, assume that the
battle will determine who has truth on their side.
8 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984). This view is also shared by
adversary system critics. Cf., e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 6, 87;J. FRANK, supra note
1, at 80-102, 108-25.
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the system,9 it is doubtful that many people think that an adversary
contest is the best way to discover what actually happened. Neither
scientists, engineers, historians nor scholars from any other disci-
pline use bi-polar adversary trials to determine facts. Following the
space shuttle explosion, for example, no one proposed that the in-
vestigating Presidential Commission adopt the procedures of adver-
sary civil or criminal trials. Indeed, the suggestion that a
commission investigating any disaster might wish to follow such
procedures seems quite strange, and many people would react in-
credulously were such procedures adopted. In matters of impor-
tance, we want an active investigative body capable both of testing
any credible hypotheses and of amassing evidence from any source
relevant to them. In trials, party control of evidence acquisition and
presentation limits the number of possible hypotheses presented
and restricts the evidence which is available to assess these hypothe-
ses.10 For this reason, trials are generally thought to be less reliable
historical fact-finding procedures than more active investigative
procedures.
Other factors that render suspect the truth-finding capacities of
adversary criminal trials include the fact that the parties are gener-
ally committed to prevailing rather than to discovering the truth.
Thus, the parties inevitably shape the evidence and use their persua-
sion skills toward that end.1' The lay jury, inexperienced in the
ways of lawyers and in the assessment of witnesses, may easily be
misled.' 2 The rules of evidence, particularly the exclusionary rules,
9 See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 30; Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985).
10 This article does not suggest, however, either that adversary proceedings have no
value in settling issues or that there are no respectable disciplines that use adversary
proceedings. Philosophical and scholarly debate is often adversarial, and even investi-
gating commissions may invite adversarial presentations. Such presentations are often
used to illuminate, to overcome adversarial bias, to persuade and to help the commis-
sion decide between possible courses of action. There is a difference, however, between
those adversary proceedings in which the decision-maker has the power and ability itself
to uncover information and where many adversary viewpoints may be presented and
those adversary proceedings that are controlled by parties who present only two oppos-
ing points of view. Only the latter types of proceeding are addressed in this article.
I " "Partisan lawyers do not try to uncover the truth. On the contrary, lawyers trained
and commissioned to seek justice, are engaged very often in helping to obstruct and
divert the search for truth." M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 75. Furthermore,
"[tfrequently the partisanship of the opposing lawyers blocks the uncovering of vital
evidence or leads to a presentation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it." J. FRANK,
supra note 1, at 81.
12 "Unable to cope with complicated information that is scrambled by cross examina-
tion, jurors are pushed into relying on their intuition or into making value judgments
based on pretrial beliefs." Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed the Trial, The Nat'l L.J., Aug. 12,
[Vol. 78
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may keep relevant evidence from the jury.1 3 The unilateral discov-
ery rule, which in many jurisdictions requires at least some pretrial
disclosure of the prosecution's case 14 without requiring a reciprocal
disclosure from the defense, permits the defense to tailor and ma-
nipulate facts to its advantage.' 5 The privilege against self-incrimi-
nation prevents the state from requiring the defendant to testify
and, thus, forecloses an important source of evidence for the prose-
cution.' 6 Finally, the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt is exceptionally difficult to meet. In practical
effect, the prosecution's failure to meet that burden may result in a
guilty party's acquittal.
1985, at 15, col. 3 (citing Vinson, Psychological Anchors: Influencing the Jury, 8 LITIGATION
20 (1982)).
Studies ofjuries in civil cases suggest additional problems.
One disturbing strategy jurors may employ when expert testimony is in direct
conflict is to ignore all expert testimony and evaluate the case on other
grounds ...
Another evaluative strategy jurors use to reason through conflicting expert tes-
timony is to favor the side they judge to have the most credibility ...
Expert testimony that is not credible may have a detrimental "spillover" effect
on other evidence, calling it into question. For example, if an expert testifies to a
fact or expresses an opinion that seems mildly discordant or preposterous in rela-
tion to evidence already presented, jurors may doubt the earlier evidence, no matter
how reliable it may be ...
There is a third and less extreme strategy jurors may adopt. Studies of the
effects of conflicting expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony
show that, while jurors considered the experts' advice, the net effect of the conflict
is that one witness neutralizes the impact of the other. It is as if no expert testimony
was presented.
Goodman, Greene & Loftus, What Confuses Jurors in Complex Court Cases, The L.A. DailyJ.,
Nov. 21, 1985, at 16, col. 3.
Generally, juries are thought to be more lenient than judges on the issue of guilt.
H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 58 (1966). Those members of the school of
Judge Frank would take this tendency as evidence ofjury fact-finding incompetence. Cf.
J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 108, 145. Others view disagreements between judges and
juries as evidence that juries sometimes bend the law to comport with their sense of
what is fair, just and equitable. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 163 (1986).
13 See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 1. "Under the adversary system, much
logically relevant and cognitively valuable information never reaches the
factfinder .. " Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083, 1094 n.22 (1975).
14 Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976).
15 Cf. J. KUNEN, supra note 7. Scholars support the practitioners' view that the de-
fense attorney's aim is not truth or fairness, but the most favorable outcome possible for
his or her client. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards
and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 200 (1984). In pursuit of this aim,
the defense attorney's whole effort may be to make the worse seem to be the better case.
Trial attorney training manuals are replete with techniques and suggestions for how to
accomplish this goal. See, e.g., W. BROCKETr &J. KFKER, EFFECTIVE DIRECT AND CROSS-
EXAMINATION (1986). CfJ. KUNEN, supra note 7, at 94-96, 214-15, 244.
16 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 1, at 528-29.
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Advocacy ideology and its associated advocate's ethos are of
particular importance in assessing the truth-finding capacity of crim-
inal trials. In the adversary system, the adversary is interested in
winning rather than in the discovery of truth. This ethos is best cap-
tured by the two principles articulated by Murray Schwartz: the
principles of non-accountability and professionalism. The principle
of non-accountability holds that "[w]hen acting as an advocate for a
client ... a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally ac-
countable for the means used or the ends achieved."1 7 The princi-
ple of professionalism holds that "a lawyer must, within the
established constraints upon professional behavior, maximize the
likelihood that the client will prevail."' 8
As this ethos plays itself out in adversary criminal trials, the ad-
vocate tries to frame and shape the evidence and inferences in her
favor whether or not such manipulation actually corresponds to
what really happened or to the facts as the advocate knows them. It
is difficult, however, to see how the truth (historical fact) can be un-
covered where at least one party to the proceedings is actively seek-
ing to hide the truth because it is damaging to her client. As an
element of trial design in a truth-finding theory of trial, the advocacy
ethos presupposes an "invisible hand" theory of competition. 19
This theory is based on the premise that when two advocates vigor-
ously oppose each other in an effort to do their best for their client,
rather than with the aim of discovering truth, they inadvertently
serve the systemic goal of truth-finding. The respective efforts of
the opposing attorneys to maximize the interests of their side lead
to the best systemic results even though neither attorney directly
tries to achieve these ends.
In such a system, the truth might emerge if the mutual and mis-
leading distortions of the two equally matched and similarly pur-
posed adversaries annihilated each other, like a collision of particles
in a cyclotron, leaving historical fact behind as a trace particle. This
cherished belief is, however, just a hopeful supposition derived from
advocacy ideology. There is no empirical evidence indicating that
the contests of advocates deliver truth in this manner.
17 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 150.
18 Id.
19 The arguments suggested by Luban relative to the rights theory of the adversary
system are effectively extrapolated at this point to the truth-finding purpose of the ad-




B. FAIR DECISION THEORY
The foregoing features of adversary criminal trials, which sug-
gest that the criminal adversary system is structurally truth-dysfunc-
tional, give rise to the "fair decision theory" of trial. The strictest
form of this trial theory holds that trials are not a good way to dis-
cover the truth, because the truth of what actually happened is prob-
ably unknowable. In a criminal trial situation, nonetheless, there is
a dispute between the state and an individual that needs to be re-
solved. The best we can do is arrange a criminal dispute resolution
procedure that is at least fair to both the state and the individual. 20
The procedural elements of party control, party commitment to
winning, and jury fact determination are viewed as conducive to fair-
ness because they lead to a potentially equal contest before an unbi-
ased decision-maker. In this scheme, the evidentiary rules are
necessary to insure that the jury will not be unduly influenced by
suspect evidence. Broader fairness considerations arguably account
for the unilateral discovery rules and the privilege against self-in-
crimination, both of which are essential to offset the government's
resource advantages and to insure that the government plays fairly
by preventing coerced admissions or confessions.
Fair decision theory alone cannot account for the adversarial
nature of the system, because it is possible to conceive of fair deci-
sion procedures which do not involve adversariness or at least the
degree of adversariness found in our criminal trial system. The Eu-
ropean inquisitorial or investigative system of criminal trial is one
example of a system that is thought to be fair, but not adversarial. 21
There is some evidence, however, that party control of adver-
sarial proceedings gives affected participants a greater sense of fair-
ness and perhaps a greater willingness to accept the outcome. 22
Nonetheless, party control is but one feature of adversary criminal
20 This appears to be the thrust of Fuller's argument. Fuller, supra note 1.
In the end, the justification for the adversary system lies in the fact that it is a means
by which the capacities of the individual may be lifted to the point where he gains
the power to view reality through eyes other than his own, where he is able to be-
come as impartial, and as free from prejudice, as "the lot of humanity will admit."
Id. at 47.
21 For a discussion of the inquisitorial system, see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra
note 1, at 556-57. See generally J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GER-
MANY (1977).
22 There is also empirical evidence, subject to varying interpretations, indicating that
experimental subjects prefer adversary fact-finding procedures to other procedures and
find them to be the most fair. J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURALJUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS 113-14 (1975). Cf. Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Pre-
cision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083 (1975)(critiquing Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary
Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972)).
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trial, and a psychological explanation of party control does not ex-
plain other criminal trial features such as the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to jury trial, the evidentiary complications
caused by a jury trial, or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. These features also cannot be explained by fairness consid-
erations. Leaving aside coercion or other abuses external to trial,
nothing seems inherently unfair about requiring a defendant to give
testimony, requiring criminal cases to be tried before a judge or
panel of judges, admitting some of the evidence that now is ex-
cluded, or using a different burden of proof.
For these reasons, it is clear that something more than simple
fairness is the operative determinant of the structure of criminal tri-
als. Plainly, the criminal defendant has a set of rights which may
interfere with truth-finding and which go beyond immediate fairness
considerations. A defendant's right against self-incrimination, the
right to unilateral discovery from the prosecution, the right to a jury
trial, and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for exam-
ple, are potentially significant barriers to truth-finding. These rights
of the defendant are not matched by an equivalent set of
prosecutorial rights. Indeed, from a fair contest point of view, an
adversary criminal trial has an asymmetric shape, with one side hav-
ing qualitatively and quantitatively different and considerably more
rights than the other. Furthermore, the prosecution has fairness ob-
ligations which are not reciprocated.
To explain this skewed structure, a fair decision theorist might
suggest that there is a kind of "rights offset" where the defendant is
given a set of rights to offset the natural resource and public support
advantages of the prosecutor.23 Some of the defendant's unilateral
rights thus might be construed as at least partially animated by fair-
ness concerns, where fairness is understood broadly as a matter of
equalizing advantages and disadvantages. This explanation makes
some sense, but, it seems to be a strange way of handicapping to
produce an equal contest. A defendant's criminal trial rights are ob-
viously both more and less than a counterweight to governmental-
prosecutorial advantages. They are more than a counterweight in
that they amount to a potential systematic frustration of governmen-
tal power in all cases, whether or not a particular defendant needs
the advantage conferred. They are less than a counterweight to
governmental prosecutorial advantages in that in many, if not most,
trials the "rights offset" does not in fact compensate for the govern-
ment's power and resources. Giving a defendant exactly the same
23 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 158.
[Vol. 78126
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resources as the government might, notwithstanding the general
public relations advantage of the government, produce a more
equal contest than the current structure. 24 Thus, a criminal defend-
ant's unilateral trial rights do not fit well into either a truth-finding
or fair contest theory of trial.
C. TRUTH-FINDING AND FAIR DECISION THEORIES JOINED
Truth-finding and fairness theories of criminal trial are some-
times joined, and this combination may account for adversary crimi-
nal trial structure. For example, in Polk County v. Dodgson,25 the
United States Supreme Court said that "[t]he system assumes that
adversarial trial testing will advance the public interests in truth and
fairness." ' 26 Other opinions suggest that truth and fairness are not
separate interests to be pursued, but that they are intimately con-
nected.27 The connecting idea appears to be that a fair procedure
represents a means of ensuring that the truth will be discovered.
Furthermore, if the truth is discovered in trial and illegal methods
were not used to obtain the truth, the trial could not have been
unfair.
Thus, there are two reasons to join truth and fairness as twin
purposes of adversary criminal trials. First, an unfair decisional pro-
cedure may lead to erroneous fact-finding. Second, there is a need
to account for the truth dysfunctionality of trials. If criminal trials
are not good truth-finding mechanisms, as many observers agree
they are not, then we must offer some other value that trials are
structured to protect in order to explain why we use the adversarial
system. Because criminal trials principally err on the side of errone-
ous acquittals, the apparent conclusion is that this price is justified
by our concern for fairness to the defendant.
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUTH-FINDING AND FAIR DECISION
PROCEDURES
The ease of associating the idea of an adversary criminal trial as
a truth-finding device with the idea of using such a trial as a fair
decision procedure demonstrates the close relationship between the
two concepts. By definition, an unfair decision procedure or pro-
24 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 158.
25 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
26 Id. at 318.
27 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
Such statements prove nothing. These statements may, however, reflect a hope that if




cess has a built-in bias. In this sense, because an unbiased decision
procedure is likely to produce a different result than a biased proce-
dure, the decisional result of an unfair procedure cannot be a "true"
result. For this reason, we tend to connect fair procedures with cor-
rect or "true" results. The truth-finding and fair decision notions of
the purpose of the adversary criminal trial system, therefore, seem
fully compatible and mutually reinforcing.
This resolution, however, is not completely satisfactory. While a
fair procedure may lead to a correct result in the sense that it is an
unbiased result, there is no necessary correlation between an unbi-
ased result and what actually happened. In other words, the idea of
truth which is present in the notions of correct or "true" results is
not necessarily the same idea of truth which is present in the notion
of truth-finding. Truth-finding generally refers to the discovery of
"what actually happened" and is thought of as the exact correspon-
dence between what we presently assert and the actual reality of a
past event. When "true" results are referred to as following from a
fair decision procedure or contest, however, truth is, in effect, being
defined by fairness; what is fairly decided is true, simply because it
was fairly decided.
In our thinking about the adversary system we tend to confuse
these two different concepts of truth. It is often wrongly assumed
that a trial that is a fair contest is a trial that produces "true" results
which correspond to the facts of "what actually happened." There
is a similar problem with the idea of fairness in the concept of "fair
decisicn procedure." Although ordinarily we do not use the terms
"fair" or "unfair" in reference to scientific investigations, it does
make sense to speak of such an investigation as a "fair" treatment of
the problem or as "fair" to the underlying facts. In scientific investi-
gations, all possible sources of error or bias must be found and cor-
rected for. An erroneous or biased investigative method, which is,
in effect, an "unfair"method is suspect in principle because it is not
likely to disclose the true state of affairs.
A procedure can be fair or unfair, however, in ways that are
unrelated to the discovery of the true state of affairs. A football
game, for instance, which is a kind of decision procedure, is fair if it
is played according to rules that are fairly enforced by the officials.
If the rules of any game or proceeding are neutral as to result and
are enforced without bias, the game or proceeding is fair whether or
not the result reflects some other state of affairs, such as whether the
better team actually won or whether the actual facts of some prior
event in issue were truly disclosed.
A criminal trial is both an investigation and a contest. It is im-
[Vol. 78
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portant to understand, however, that the factors that make the trial a
fair contest, in the sense of using neutral rules which are neutrally
applied, are not necessarily the same as the factors that make it a fair
investigation, in the sense of using a process designed to elicit actual
facts. A fair investigation could be an unfair contest or no contest at
all; a fair contest could be an unfair investigation or no investigation
at all. Similarly, a trial that produces "true" results and is a fair
contest is not necessarily a trial that uncovers "truth" in the sense of
"what actually happened." Finally, a trial that uncovers the "truth,"
in the sense of "what actually happened," is not necessarily a fair
trial producing "true" results because it may not have been a fair
contest.
Trial fairness appears to be an independent purpose of the
structure of the adversary criminal trial, but the fairness of the pro-
cedures is not a guarantee of the truth-finding capacity of trials. As
an independent purpose, trial fairness may actually interfere with
truth-finding. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that our pursuit of fairness
explains the adversary criminal trial structure, because, as previ-
ously noted, fairness does not require a particular set of procedures.
Fairness notwithstanding, the question remains why our justice sys-
tem uses the particular adversary criminal trial features that we use.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF TRIAL TRUTH AND FAIRNESS
Perhaps the truth-finding and fair decision theories should be
viewed as limited to the universe of law. 28 In this view, law is just
one of a number of kinds of discourse about the world. As a dis-
course, the law has its own concepts, categories of thought, and
ways of perceiving and processing information. 29 Legal discourse
28 The view presented here is an elaboration of the notion that the adversary system
is a system of proof rather than a system of discovery of what actually happened. There
are occasional undeveloped references to this idea in the literature. "[I]t is not that
tools for determining truth are imprecise, but that the truth may not be ascertainable by
any means in the form we seek it. What we are trying to measure may be indefinable."
Briscoe, ". . . For the Devil Does not Know Man's Intentions. . . ", 44 AusT. LJ. 31 (1970).
Let no one pretend that our system ofjustice is a search for truth. It is nothing of
the kind. It is a contest between two sides played according to certain rules, and if
the truth happens to emerge as the result of the contest, then that is pure wind-
fall. . . . It is not something with which the contestants are concerned. They are
concerned only that the game should be played according to the rules. There are
many rules and one of them is that some questions which might provide a shortcut
to the truth are not allowed to be asked, and those that are asked are not allowed to
be answered. The result is that verdicts are often reached haphazardly for the
wrong reasons, in spite of the evidence, and may or may not coincide with the truth.
The tragedy of our courts is that means have come to count more than ends, form
more than content, appearance more than reality.
L. KENNEDY, THE TRIAL OF STEPHEN WARD 251 (1964).
29 C. GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 173-75 (1983).
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may, in some respects, track the world in the same way that other
kinds of discourse do, while in other respects it may not. Legal dis-
course is simply one of many approaches of dealing with the world.
Just as the legal discourse describes a person differently than does
ordinary language, for example, the law considers a corporation to
be a person for some legal purposes, so too the law may also have
both a different concept of truth and a different way of finding truth
than do other systems of thought.
A trial is an accusatory proceeding. As such, trials have no ab-
stract interest in what happened independent of the accusation. In
other words, the issue in a trial is the truth of the accusation, and the
accusation is true if it is proven to be true within the rules of proof
and persuasion. In this manner, a trial produces truth, rather than
finds it. This truth is a "legal" truth and is that which the system
recognizes as true.
V. CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE MANUFACTURING OF FACT
In criminal trials, the verdict is a combination of a judgment
about historical "fact" and a decision about culpability for what is
thought to have happened. While the two are deeply related, gener-
ally we separate them conceptually. In a homicide trial, for exam-
ple, the questions of historical fact are those regarding the
circumstances of the victim's death: how did he die?; from what did
he die?; how was the defendant physically involved in the victim's
death? The culpability question, however, addresses the degree of
the defendant's responsibility for the victim's death and is a mixed
fact and value question of intentionality.
In reaching a verdict in a criminal trial, the trier of fact must
draw inferences from historical fact in order to settle the question of
intentionality. The process is more complicated than this statement
suggests, however, because in most trials historical fact itself is in
dispute. Additionally, the kind of historical fact with which the law
is concerned may not even exist in any meaningful way independent
of the method of proof.
In the conceptual universe of law, fact and law are radically sep-
arated. Trial decisions are considered to involve two distinctly dif-
ferent operations: determination of facts and application of law to
the facts. This conception of the relationship between law and fact
posits that the major issue in trials is the determination of what actu-
ally happened. The criminal adversary jury trial does not, however,
appear to be a particularly good way to determine historical fact.
The failure of the adversary system as a method of finding historical
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fact has led to strong criticisms of the system and proposals for how
it could be changed to improve its fact-finding methodology.
Further consideration reveals that the critique of trials as truth-
finding devices is fundamentally mistaken because there is no radi-
cal separation of fact and law. "[L]egal facts are made not born, are
socially constructed. . .by everything from evidence rules, court-
room etiquette, and law reporting traditions, to advocacy tech-
niques, the rhetoric ofjudges, and the scholasticisms of law school
education. . . "30 Facts are "close edited diagrams of reality." 3'
The rendering of fact so that lawyers can plead it, judges can hear
it and juries settle it is just that: a rendering. As in any trade, science,
cult or art, law, which is a bit of all of these, molds the world into a
world in which its descriptions make sense. . . . At base, it is not what
happened, but what happens, that law sees; and if law differs, from this
place to that, this time to that, this people to that, what it sees does as
well.32
In other words, the law manufactures facts from the raw data of
reality so that it can perform its operations on them. Facts do not
announce themselves as facts. The data from which factual conclu-
sions are drawn is ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.
Furthermore, the same data can constitute a different fact under a
different theory of what the data means. For example, assume that a
man has a rifle with a small worn spot in its firing chamber. What
are the facts?
(1) The rifle was not manufactured properly and, as a result, the
metal in the chamber had a low spot that wore unevenly as the
weapon was used;
(2) While cleaning the weapon one day, the man found a small
nick. He took a piece of bronze wool and rubbed out the nick, per-
haps a little too enthusiastically. Rubbing out the nick produced the
worn mark;
(3) At a gun show, the man bought a small part that he could put
in the operating mechanism so that the rifle could fire automatically.
He has fired the weapon automatically but has since removed the
part because it is illegal to possess an automatic weapon. The worn
spot is the place where the part struck the chamber when the gun
was fired automatically.
The mark is on the rifle, but its meaning lies in its explanation.
Different explanations interpret the mark differently. The mark as
data becomes a fact only when it finds a place in a theory or explana-





tion. In this sense, "facts are theory laden,"'3 3 and facts in law are
laden with legal theory. The business of trials and trial lawyers is to
manufacture such facts. Theories fabricate facts, and they construct
facts from data. Facts are thus elements in a net of signification in
which the whole explains the parts and the parts explain the whole.
In the rifle example, suppose the man was arrested and the rifle was
found in his possession. The worn spot was discovered in a routine
forensic examination. Assume that:
(1) The man is an employed family man without a police record;
(2) The man is unemployed, attempted to assault the officer when
he was arrested, was found with another weapon in his possession
and also possessed mercenary and terrorist literature. In each case,
suppose the man is prosecuted for the federal firearms offense of
altering a rifle to fire automatically. In which case is he most likely to
be convicted?
Although in either case, he may or may not have deliberately
altered the weapon, the theory that he did alter it fits best with the
second assumed case. It fits better in that case because the man
seems to be the kind of person who might commit this crime. Fur-
ther, ajury is more likely to believe that someone who reads terror-
ist literature would want an automatic weapon. In the second
assumed case, the theory of deliberate alteration fits the data, the
cast of characters and ordinary beliefs.
34
When there is uncertainty about what happened, the uncer-
tainty must be settled through meaningful constructions of the data
or evidence presented. The data, in turn, is generated by theories
or stories proposed to explain all of the data, including the credibil-
33 See N. HANSON, PATrERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF
WORLDMAKING 91-97 (1978). Legal thinkers have almost arrived at the same insight.
"You cannot decide which facts matter unless you have already selected, at least tenta-
tively, applicable decisional standards. But most of the time you cannot understand
these legal standards without relating them to the factual situation of the case."
Damaska, Presentation of Evidence, supra note 13, at 1087 n.7. What this statement misses,
however, is the fact that legal theories or decisional standards may determine not only
which facts matter, but also what counts as fact.
3 [A] version [of the world] is taken to be true when it offends no unyielding
beliefs and none of its own precepts. Among beliefs unyielding at a given time may
be long-lived reflections of laws of logic, short-lived reflections of recent observa-
tions, and other convictions and prejudices ingrained with varying degrees of firm-
ness. Among precepts, for example, may be choices among alternative frames of
reference, weightings and derivational bases. But the line between beliefs and
precepts is neither sharp nor stable. Beliefs are framed in concepts informed by
precepts . .f.
Truth, far from being a solemn and severe master, is a docile and obedient
servant. . . . [The scientist] seeks system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfied on
these scores he tailors truth to fit. He as much decrees as discovers the laws he sets
forth, as much designs as discerns the patterns he delineates.
N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING, supra note 32, at 18 (citations omitted).
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ity of those who presented it. In effect, we create facts by embed-
ding data in socially acceptable explanations. 35 A decision about
what the "facts" are is an implicit acceptance of the theory or story
which gives the data credible meaning by connecting it into a unified
whole.
A trial is, therefore, a contest over the meaning of evidence,
and the "evidence" is data that the trial attorneys have already
shaped into some frame of reference. That frame of reference is a
theory of the case or a story that makes sense in some world view
embedded in the law. The trier of fact uses all of the trial data,
including the respective attorneys' shaping and reading of the evi-
dence, to draw its own inferences and to generate its own reading of
the evidence. When the trier of fact is a lay jury, it may import read-
ings different from those considered permissible by legally trained
persons.
"Truth," in the context of an adversary trial, is thus, the infer-
ences of ultimate historical fact and liability that the fact-finder
draws from the "evidence" that the adversaries help to fashion.
How closely such "truth" comports with the "real truth," whatever
that might be, is indeterminable.
Jury verdicts are a composite of influenced "fact" determina-
tions and associated value judgments. These determinations and
judgments are mediated by the jurors' own conceptions of how the
world and people operate and are filtered through the mental tem-
plates that the law imposes on the interpretation of conduct. In this
sense, there is no truth regarding criminal liability independent of the
truth determined at trial, and trials are more truth-producing than
truth-finding events. In other words, trials produce what we are
willing to accept as truth.36
Obviously, this interpretation of an adversary criminal trial as a
way to discover truth is very different from the simple notion that
trials are an ideal procedure to discover what actually happened.
This rendition of the truth-finding theory, which depends on the
redefiniton of the meaning of truth, is actually a disguised version of
the theory that the purpose of trials is to reach a decision acceptable
under prevailing social and cultural norms and beliefs. If society
35 This also explains why trials are framed as competitions between stories.
36 "In many of these [criminal trials], objective truth is more ambiguous, if it exists
at all. Such truth exists only as it emerges from the fact-determining process, and
accuracy in this context really means relative equality of results as between defend-
ants similarly situated and relative congruence between the formal verdict and our
understanding of society's less formally expressed evaluation of such conduct."
Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 113
(Task Force on the Admin. ofJustice 1967).
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accepts its system of criminal trial proof, which assumedly it does
because society thinks it is the right, fair and just way to make these
decisions, then society also of necessity accepts as correct the results
of that system.
Assuming the foregoing is what the legal system really means
by truth in the context of the adversary criminal trial, problems re-
main. There often may be gaps between what the legal system con-
cludes is the truth and what someone with an ordinary world view
would conclude actually happened. Because serious consequences
flow from criminal adjudication, questions arise as to why society
tolerates these gaps and exactly what benefits, if any, the adversarial
system provides.
VI. THE RIGHTS THEORY OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
Any attempt to determine why society tolerates a system that it
knows is in some sense defective as a truth-finding device leads to a
third view of the purpose of adversary criminal trial, namely, the
rights theory. Under one version of this position, termed the stan-
dard rights view, a defendant's trial rights are seen as designed in
part to make it difficult for the government to bring and win any
prosecution.3 7 Under this view, either truth-finding or fair decision,
or both, are accepted as central purposes of adversary criminal tri-
als. Trials, however, are also structured to accomplish an additional
political purpose: to ensure that the power of prosecution is not
used as a general power of persecution. Thus, defendants' trial
rights protect all citizens from the possible abuse of the govern-
ment's power and resources.38
The criminal law is one of the government's greatest weapons.
Obviously, it can be used to control populations by harsh means.
Compared to the average citizen, the government has overwhelming
resources and tremendous credibility advantages. Furthermore,
judges are government officials, and, in the long run, they are not
likely to oppose the government. Even if judges develop a culture
of independence from the government, all professional judging
would still tend toward bureaucratic justice. Judging seems inher-
ently to tend toward rigorous administration of calculable rules, a
dehumanized justice little concerned with individual differences.39
A defendant's trial rights, therefore, intervene to handicap the gov-
37 Luban, supra note 1, at 91-92.
38 Id.
39 M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SocIETY 976 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
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emnment's use of criminal prosecution and its ability to influence
outcomes.
The adversary criminal trial can be understood as a check on a
significant risk of persecution or an otherwise too enthusiastic pros-
ecution policy. The rights position also implies a concern with the
risk of erroneous conviction. Because adversary trials are neither an
accurate nor dependable way of determining facts, there is a great
risk of error in trial verdicts. Both parties in court run that risk:
trials may produce erroneous convictions or erroneous acquittals.
In a symmetrical adversary system, and given the relative ease of
prosecuting and the relative difficulty of defending against prosecu-
tions, the risk of erroneous convictions seems greater than that of
erroneous acquittals. Because of the serious consequences of crimi-
nal convictions, it is better to risk erroneous acquittals than errone-
ous convictions. 40 Criminal trials, therefore, should be structurally
skewed to favor acquittals.
Making prosecution more diffcult is one way to redistribute the
risk of error arising from criminal trial decisions. There may be
other ways as well. Equalizing prosecutorial and defense resources,
for instance, might do as much to reduce the risk of wrongful con-
victions as all of the defendant's unilateral trial rights. Considera-
tion of such alternatives leads to the implicit question of why the risk
of trial error should be redistributed through a system of trial rights,
rather than through some other means. The rights theorist would
simply respond that a system of trial rights was the only available
means to check governmental power when the adversary criminal
trial system was developed.
41
The rights theory provides a credible account of the truth dys-
functionality of criminal trials. The rights theory also provides a
more satisfactory account of the asymmetric structure of trials as
contests than does the fair decision theory. The standard rights
view also has the merit of partially accounting for the peculiar ethos
of criminal trial attorneys: to win, rather than to discover truth.
For the criminal defense attorney, the discovery and revelation
of the truth to the jury is just one means to the end of winning a
case. The truth does not matter very much unless it allows the client
to go free. In the standard rights view of criminal trials, the criminal
defense attomey and his competitive ethos are necessary to make it
more difficult for the government to bring and win prosecutions.
40 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 158.
41 It is undeniably true that some of a criminal defendant's trial rights were function-
ally developed for this reason. Cf. H. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 1200-
1800 (1985); J. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1600-1800 (1985).
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The defense attorney is permitted to play unfairly in the sense that
he or she has no duty to discover the truth, except to avoid assisting
in the commission of known perjury or the use of false evidence.
Furthermore, the defense attorney may present any plausible de-
fense, even if it is false. By contrast, the prosecutor is required to
play fairly in the sense that he or she cannot hide the truth if it is
known to be favorable to the defendant. The necessity to confront
plausible, but false, defenses obviously makes it more difficult for
the prosecutor to obtain a conviction.
There is also an expanded version of this rights view which sees
a criminal trial as a forum for enforcing a regime of individual con-
stitutional rights designed to limit criminal law enforcement powers
generally.42 To the list of a defendant's unilateral trial rights, this
view would add fourth amendment rights against search and
seizure, 43 the Miranda expansions of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, 44 and the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel decisions enforced by the exclusionary rule.45 Law enforcement
violations of any of these rights call for the exclusion of probative
evidence from the criminal trial. Under this view, the strong version
of the rights thesis, trial design incorporates not only fundamental
political and policy decisions to handicap the government in crimi-
nal prosecutions, but also a decision to vindicate constitutional
rights by providing a forum to discover and remedy their
violation.
46
This strong version of the rights thesis outlines the basic logic
of the position, but at an even greater cost to the truth-finding and
fair contest functions of trials. The strong rights theorist may argue
that while the enforcement of rights may limit the ways in which
42 M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3-4 (1975).
43 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
44 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45 E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264 (1980).
46 See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 42, at 3-4. This view has not gone uncriticized:
Such widespread adoption of conventional rules [i.e., the various exclusionary
rules] as essentials of due process seriously distorts factual hearing and weakens the
protection of primary personal right that criminal law should provide. Invasion of
the victim's primary right goes unprosecuted as a consequence of police invasion of
the criminal's civil right, which likewise goes unprosecuted. We have set fire to the
house of criminal law in our attempt to roast the police pig. Defenders of the prac-
tice of suppressing evidence argue that criminal process provides an appropriate
forum for correction of its own abuses and, therefore, suppression of evidence is
both permissible and desirable. The abuses, however, are not those of courts but of
government agents-investigators and police-and our corrective efforts should be
directed against them, not against reliability of criminal hearing.
M. FLEMING, OF CRIMES AND RIGHTS 155 (1978).
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truth is pursued, there are right and wrong ways to pursue truth. If
the government would adhere to the correct ways, rights would
pose no problem to truth-seeking. Similarly, the rights theorist
would say that although trials are asymmetrical contests, they are
not really unfair to the government, for rights are appropriate
checks on government activity. While this gloss makes the strong
rights view consistent with a belief in criminal trials as truth-finding
or fair decision events, it cannot justify the "win" ethos of criminal
trial attorneys, which, unless it adopts the standard version of the
right theory, regards rights as means and not ends in themselves.
Under the strong rights view, the "win" ethos of defense attor-
neys is arguably essential to the vindication of defendants', and by
implication other persons', constitutional rights. It would, however,
be a mistake to consider defense attorneys as rights knights or
paladins. Defense attorneys often seek to enforce rights not for the
sake of preserving the constitutional regime, but to inhibit the dis-
covery of truth for the purpose of winning. Motions to suppress
relevant evidence have no other motivation. For the criminal de-
fense attorney, the enforcement of constitutional rights is only a
means to the end of winning or getting the best possible disposition.
If a constitutional right doesn't contribute to those ends, it will be
waived. Although the "win" ethos doesn't necessarily secure consti-
tutional rights in individual cases, it may, however, secure them bet-
ter than other altematives. 47
In the rights view, then, trial design incorporates a fundamental
political decision to circumscribe the power of the government to
punish or harass people through criminal proceedings. It also in-
corporates a policy decision, arising from the weakness of the adver-
sary trial as an accurate truth- finding device, to favor acquittals over
convictions. A necessary result of these kinds of checks on govern-
mental power, however, is a deterioration of the criminal trial as a
47 This is an empirical question on which there have been no studies. It is, however,
certainly a belief among public defenders and some criminal defense attorneys. Indeed,
a few years ago, when public defenders' stock was particularly low, some of them wore
T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan "Liberty's Defenders." Kunen expresses the same
view in stating: "Of course it's terrible for guilty people to go free. That's the price we pay
for not having cops crawling in and out of our houses." J. KuNEN, supra note 7, at 166
(emphasis added in original).
Anyone who does a significant amount of criminal defense work, except perhaps
those who are utterly cynical or are simply in it for the money, must at some point
confront the moral and psychological problems associated with representing persons
whom the public despises and who may have committed terrible crimes. The justifica-
tion that such representation helps advance larger systemic goals, such as the further-
ance of liberty, may ameliorate the internal conflicts, ease the moral labor and permit
the attorney to continue in his or her work.
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successful truth-finding procedure or as a neutral, unbiased contest.
A defendant's trial rights operate as strong constraints on the crimi-
nal trial as an investigative search for truth or as a fair decision
procedure.
48
The rights theory is essentially a testing theory.49 Testing theo-
ries of criminal trial are attractive because they provide an explana-
tion of the asymmetric character of criminal trials and the heavy
burdens placed upon the prosecutor. What a testing theory cannot
explain in its own terms, however, is the level of difficulty set by the
test. Presumably, the rights theorist would say that the level of diffi-
culty was set through experience. The accumulation of centuries of
Anglo-American experience with government prosecutions led both
to the common law of trial structure and to the criminal trial rights
established in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.
Expansive case law interpretations of these rights simply reflect
more contemporaneous experience.
VII. THE BARGAINING INCENTIvE THEORY
The bargaining incentive theory5° is a pragmatic offshoot of the
rights theory. It takes the structure of an adversary criminal trial
and a defendant's unilateral trial rights as historical givens which
48 For a very helpful discussion of the idea of side constraints, see R. NozIcK, ANAR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974).
49 Some theorists based the rights theory on "dignity" interests. See generally M.
FREEDMAN, supra note 42. The basic idea of this approach is that the particular schedule
of rights that we possess derives from the resolve to treat all humans in certain civilized
ways in order to acknowledge their humanity and accord them the dignity associated
with being human. This seems to me to be an elevated way of saying that we have rights
in order to protect people from the abuses of governmental power. Casting the discus-
sion in terms of dignity interests, however, does not seem to advance it in any useful
way, and thus this Article uses a more direct approach.
On the other hand, one could argue that a dignity interests rights theory is not a
testing theory. Under a testing theory, rights insure a structural test of the govern-
ment's case and for that reason provide a protection against possible abuse. A dignity
theorist, however, might argue that we have rights as ends in themselves, rather than as
a means to some other end such as protection from the government. In effect, this view
equates the possession of certain kinds of rights with being human. Consequently,
whether or not the rights serve as a check on government, one would still be entitled to
them. Cf M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). Rights would,
nonetheless, remain side constraints on the search for truth.
50 The following includes extrapolations from the author's experience as a public
defender and from M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 89-93. What is apparently a predomi-
nant practice and what Frankel deplores as a demonstration of the unworkability of our
current system of adversary criminal trial, has been developed into a positive theory
justifying the structure of the criminal adversary trial system. This new theory is devel-
oped not because the theory articulated is correct, but, rather, because it focuses on
important systemic features that other theories do not even discuss. It is also an idea
worth developing just to see where it will lead.
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form the foundation of a system of criminal case resolution that is
much greater than the trial. In this view, the balance of structural
forces in adversary criminal trials are in equipoise. In general, this
means that, for either side, going to trial is a great risk. Juries, the
skills of trial lawyers, and the exercise of a defendant's trial rights
make trial results unpredictable. The prosecution has resource and
public relations advantages over the defense, but the defense, how-
ever, has advantages of prior knowledge of the prosecution's case,
the suggestibility of the lay jury and the defense attorney's commit-
ment to winning rather than to finding the truth.
It is very difficult to say how these relative advantages will influ-
ence the outcome of any particular trial. Indeed, the unpredictabil-
ity of trials is so great that it affects the decision of each party to go
to trial. In general, the prosecution will seek to try only those cases
it believes it can win. The defense will try only those cases in which
it has nothing to lose by going to trial.
Under the bargaining theory, criminal trials are considered an
exceptional method of disposing of criminal cases, a kind of extreme
zero-sum contest resorted to only when a case cannot be satisfacto-
rily bargained. Criminal trials are structured so that each side, pros-
ecution and defense, has both bargaining power and a strong
rational incentive not to go to trial. The uncertainty of result is so
high and the risk of loss is so great, that the parties are strongly
influenced to compromise their positions and reach a negotiated
settlement.
The bargaining theory represents a system-functional view of
adversary trial which looks at the adversary system not in terms of
intellectual justifications, but in terms of its practical effects. It takes
as its effective purpose the functions of the criminal adversary sys-
tem. The bargaining theorist readily admits that the features of the
criminal adversary system were not consciously designed to create a
balance of power aimed at discouraging trial. This theorist would
assert, however, that it is a genetic fallacy to conclude that a thing,
event, process, or institution is no more than its origin. In this theo-
rist's mind, the adversary criminal trial system is a currently adapted
system, and the features of the system that were originally intended
to serve a certain purpose now effectively serve another goal. The
structure of adversary criminal trial poses no problems for the bar-
gaining theorist because he is not concerned with issues of truth
finding, trial fairness and side constraints.
There is a certain attractiveness in the bargaining theory that
causes a problem to disappear as a result of a refusal to see it, be-
cause it helps to place adversary criminal trials in perspective. For
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example, one might consider the truth dysfunctionality of criminal
trials a monumental problem if all criminal cases were tried. But the
fact that criminal disposition through trial is but a small percentage
of all criminal dispositions may mean that this problem is not very
serious. 51 This presumes, of course, that the truth dysfunctionality
of criminal trials does not have a serious impact on non-trial adjudi-
cated criminal dispositions, a matter much in doubt.52 Even the bar-
gaining theorist would admit that there are criminal trials and that
trials keystone the bargaining system. Trials must in some way radi-
ate their effects through the system and therefore impact it.
A. THE NORM THEORY
A different view of the purpose of criminal trial originates in the
perception that criminal trials are structured to be truth dysfunc-
tional and that trials play a social role greater than simple decision-
making in individual cases. Norm production or the norm theory,
53
51 Most criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Cf. Finkelstein, A StatisticalAnaly-
sis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1975); Zeisel, The
Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 407.
52 One can argue, for example, that the exclusionary rule has a signficant effect on
plea bargaining. If a prosecutor believes she will lose a defense motion to suppress
important evidence, she may be unwilling to go to trial and may instead settle for a
guilty plea to some lesser charge which the defendant is willing to accept. There has
been some empirical work on this question, but the results have been questioned.
53 As with other "theories" discusssed in this article, there is no definitive statement
of "norm theory" in the literature. This article traces the basic claim of the theory,
which is that the purpose of social rituals is to constitute community, to the great French
sociologist, Emile Durkheim. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD
(S. Solovay &J. Mueller trans. 8th ed. 1938). Thurman Arnold appears to be the first
legal scholar to have applied this idea to trials by treating them as a form of social ritual:
The judicial trial thus becomes a series of object lessons and examples. It is a
way in which society is trained in right ways of thought and action, not by compul-
sion, but by parables which it interprets and follows voluntarily. . . . For most per-
sons, the criminal trial overshadows all other ceremonies as a dramatization of the
values of our spiritual government, representing the dignity of the State as an en-
forcer of law, and at the same time the dignity of the individual when he is an
avowed opponent of the State, a dissenter, a radical, or even a criminal ...
The criminal trial is a consequence of security, because only when men are
secure are contradictory social values tolerated. It appears as an incident to the
enforcement of law and the efficient investigation of issues of fact. One of its great-
est difficulties is its necessity to appear as an efficient means of enforcement and
working order, and at the same time bring into sharp relief various deep-seated
popular moral ideals. Generally the ideal of law enforcement and efficient investi-
gation are in direct conflict with accepted social behavior. In such cases the mental
conflict between what the group thinks it ought to do, and what it actually does,
must be reconciled by the conviction of some offenders and the acquittal or the
failure to prosecute others.
T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 129-31 (D. Harbinger ed. 1962).
Nesson, in his fine article entitled The Evidence or the Event: OnJudicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1983), uses the norm theory to explain
certain rules of evidence. Nesson seems implicitly to advance the norm theory as a gen-
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like the rights theory, is a testing theory of criminal trial. While the
rights theory, at least in its standard version, envisions criminal trial
structure as a set of institutionalized protections for individuals, the
norm theory views the structure as a system designed to produce
norms that the public will readily accept.
The norm theory claims that the purpose of an adversary trial is
to produce "acceptable conclusions and thus to project substantive
legal rules." 54 It begins with the premise that a major goal of the
legal system is to articulate behavioral norms and to affirm moral
values and law abiding attitudes.55 The norm theory sees criminal
trials, which generate public judgments about conduct, as events
that project a public message or norm through a verdict. That
message is a norm if the public accepts it as such, and the public will
accept it if it believes that the condemnation of conduct embodied
in the verdict is a judgment about what actually happened.
56
According to this theory, it is not necessary that trial results re-
flect what actually happened, but only that the public believes that
they do. Trials must, therefore, be structured so that the public will
accept their results as credible. In other words, criminal trials must
have a structure which is generally perceived as a strong test of the
prosecution's case. In overcoming such substantial disadvantages as
a high burden of proof, the privilege against self-incrimination, lack
of discovery and the exclusion of probative evidence, the prosecu-
tion passes a difficult test and more convincingly proves that the de-
fendant actually did commit a crime.
The adversary ethos fits well into the norm theory. The struc-
tural purpose of the defense counsel is to insure a rigorous testing
of the prosecution's case. Defense counsel's role, therefore, is "to
design and present the most plausible defenses, even though they
may be false."'57 Such extreme testing of the prosecution's case, in
effect a kind of norm production quality control, insures that the
public will acccept a jury's finding of guilt. Under the norm theory,
the truth dysfunctionality of trials is not a great problem. Indeed,
eral explanation of adversary criminal trial structure. Where Arnold emphasizes the
symbolic character of trials as dramatizations of moral ideals, Nesson simply asserts that
trial verdicts generate norms.
Nesson's statement is the most recent and simplest statement of the norm theory.
His discussion therefore, is used as a statment of the basic premises of the theory. I have
not, however, forgotten Durkheim and Arnold, for they have valuable insights addressed
later in the Article.
54 Nesson, supra note 53, at 1390.
55 Id. at 1360.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1376.
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the theory postulates a decisional system which produces fewer pos-
itive results-convictions-than are warranted, and more negative
results-acquittals-than are warranted. This result is acceptable
because a trial system that errs on the side of certainty in its convic-
tions is more acceptable to the public than one that runs the risk of
convicting innocent people.
The norm theory explains some of the structural features of ad-
versary criminal trial such as jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, evidentiary rules restricting unreliable evidence, and the
criminal defense attorney's ethos. Under the notion that trials are
designed to be difficult tests, this theory may also account for unilat-
eral discovery from the prosecution, exclusionary rules of evidence,
and, perhaps, even jury passivity. On the other hand, the testing
portion of the norm theory may prove too much. It is always possi-
ble to argue that the existence of some constraint on proof is meant
to make proof more difficult and therefore is a test of the strength of
a proponent's case. A testing rationale cannot, however, define how
difficult the test should be. Virtually any set of constraints will
frame a test, and, theoretically, one could add constraint on con-
straint with the only results being increasingly more difficult tests.
Assuming criminal trials are arranged to make it difficult for the
prosecution to convict, what accounts for the degree of difficulty im-
posed by the particular criminal trial structure we have?
Since the norm theory turns on public acceptance of trial re-
sults, it must claim that the level of prosecutorial difficulty is an em-
pirical matter. What is critical is that the trial is structured so that
the public will accept the verdict. Public acceptance, however, is
not a stringent condition for trial structure; this suggests that under
the norm theory there may be a range of structural prosecutorial
handicaps that would satisfy this condition. In other words, unless it
also resorts to historical explanations of the kind invoked by rights
theory, norm theory cannot explain the unique set of prosecutorial
handicaps that form the structure of an American adversary criminal
trial.
There are also some features of the adversary criminal trial
structure which arguably would decrease public confidence in trial
results. The norm theory requires that the public believe that trial
results reflect what actually happened so that the public will accept
the norm projected by the verdict. If, for instance, the public knows
that probative evidence was excluded from a criminal trial that re-




Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how does the public at-
tend and receive lessons at the school of trials? How does the ver-
dict imply a norm? How is that norm promulgated to the public?
And, what does public acceptance mean? Certainly a verdict is a
judgment about perceived conduct, and, in that sense, it is a norm.
Verdicts, however, are general; they are judgments about the sum
total of what was presented to the jury. Verdicts thus appear to lack
the specificity we expect of norms that govern conduct, and they
may be such general condemnations or exonerations that they are
vacuous. In any event, except perhaps in the most news-generating
cases, few members of the public are aware of criminal case verdicts.
Of those few who are aware of a particular verdict, even fewer have
sufficient knowledge of the evidentiary details of the trial to draw
meaningful conclusions about what the jury verdict means as a
norm.
While the idea of public acceptance of verdicts as norms has a
certain rhetorical appeal, it seems rather empty. It is difficult to im-
agine what public non-acceptance of criminal trial verdicts would be
like. Evidently, public acceptance must mean something more than
a lack of an outcry; it must be something on the order of an integra-
tion into the public's stock of rules used to regulate and assess be-
havior. This is, however, a highly questionable empirical claim, and
the theory posits neither a mechanism for this integration nor em-
pirical proof that verdicts have this effect.
VIII. A UNIFIED VISION OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIALS
Each of the theories of adversary criminal trial that I have dis-
cussed thus far seems to capture some aspect of the system,
although no single theory presents a complete picture. What is cor-
rect about the truth-finding theory is that we are interested in insur-
ing that criminal trials produce true or just results under our
prevailing ideas of truth and justice. The emphasis in the fair deci-
sion theory on the need for a decision generated in accordance with
procedures which are thought to be both fair and unlikely to lead to
biased results is also correct. The rights theory is correct in its claim
that possible trial error is skewed in the direction of erroneous ac-
quittals. Both the bargaining theory and the norm theory put all of
this in perspective. The norm theory gives the adversary criminal
trial a broader social role than a simple adjudication of criminal lia-
bilities. That broader role contemplates not only decisions in indi-
58 Nesson is aware of this problem. Nesson, supra note 53, at 1367 n.31.
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vidual cases, but also the generation and promulgation of norms
reflective of contemporary community standards.
To reconcile the differences between the various theories, one
could simply assert that the adversary criminal trial system has mul-
tiple purposes and that each theory selects a single purpose as cen-
tral to the system. In this view, each univocal theory errs in
undervaluing the systemic purposes that the other theories posit.
To correct for this theoretic myopia, one could assert that the sys-
tem has all of the purposes posited by these theories: truth finding,
fair decision, protection from possible governmental abuse and
norm generation. These purposes, however, co-exist in an unstable
tension.
On further reflection, it is apparent that the theories elaborated
are in some manner variants of one another. When the truth-find-
ing theory is construed as a truth-producing theory, it reveals itself
as the fair decision theory in disguise. The rights theory is a form of
the fair decision theory that structurally incorporates a risk analysis.
The fair decision theory, the rights theory and the truth production
theory all appear to be versions of norm theory. The norm theory,
like the rights theory, is a testing theory, and it can be construed as
incorporating the systemic purposes posited by the other theories as
conditions for the community's acceptance of verdicts as norms.
These observations suggest that all of the theories have a com-
mon origin. As the most overarching of all the theories, the norm
theory seems to hold the greatest promise of revealing that origin.
The norm theory, however, is underdeveloped, and it does not ac-
count for any particular schedule of defendant's rights or explain
how verdicts are translated into operative norms. Further develop-
ment of the norm theory may remedy these defects and provide a
compelling, and unified vision of the adversary criminal trial system.
The norm theory finds its source in the work of the great
French sociologist, Emile Durkheim. Durkheim's thesis, articulated
specifically in regard to community punishments, is that the func-
tion of certain community actions, such as punishments, is to define
the community. 59 A community defines certain acts as criminal in
order to indicate what is outside the bounds of acceptable commu-
nity behavior. The community by its actions thus defines itself and
informs any prospective community member what is expected of
him or her.60 Durkheim noted, for example, that some punishments
could not have any of the effects that we normally associate with




punishment, such as revenge, deterrence or rehabilitation. Some
societies, for example, punish animals that have not committed a
wrong; others punish inanimate beings.6 1 Such punishments are rit-
ual punishments whose only function is to create the community
and establish or express social solidarity.
Durkheim also explored how social rituals operate to maintain
social ideals. According to Durkheim, the great ideals of civilization
were born in select periods of cultural innovation or crisis when
human interactions reached an intense pitch and gave birth to new
ideas. But, societies cannot maintain that intensity and instead fall
back to their normal level:
This illusion [that some ideal expresses a reality] can never last
because the exaltation cannot maintain itself at such a pitch; it is too
exhausting. Once the critical moment has passed, the social life re-
laxes, intellectual and emotional intercourse is subdued, and individu-
als fall back to their ordinary level. All that was said, done and thought
during this period of fecund upheaval survives only as a memory, a
memory no doubt as glorious as the reality it recalls, but with which it
is no longer at one. It exists as an idea or rather as a composition of
ideas. Between what is felt and perceived and what is thought of in the
form of ideals there is now a clear distinction. Nevertheless these ide-
als could not survive if they were not periodically revived. This revivi-
fication is the function of religious or secular feasts or ceremonies, all
public addresses in churches or schools, plays and exhibitions in a
word, whatever draws men together into an intellectual and moral
communion. These monfents are, as it were, minor versions of the
great creative movement.62
Durkheim's insights focus on the building and community
maintenance aspects of social rituals. His views suggest that the
commonly accepted purposes of many social actions, such as some
forms of punishment or anything that is deemed a form of ritual, are
not the sole or main functions of those actions. Rather, the main
functions are found in the solidarity effects of the ritual. Generaliz-
ing, all community rituals provide occasions for reaffirming or defin-
ing community values and thus for creating or maintaining a
community of individuals through the promotion, acceptance, adop-
tion and maintenance of shared values and ideals.
This suggests that we can most effectively develop norm theory
as it relates to adversary criminal trials by taking seriously the idea
that criminal trials are social rituals. As social rituals, criminal trials
have at least two solidarity functions. First, a criminal trial defines
61 E. DURKHEIM, THE DivisION OF LABOR IN SociETY 85-86 (1964).
62 Durkheim, On the Process of Change in Social Values, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY 1305,
1309 (T. Parsons ed. 1961).
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the community by deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence: those
who are found guilty are implicitly cast from the community, at least
for a period of time. This process defines the community by deter-
mining membership in accordance with standards applied by the
jury acting as a representative of the community.
Second, criminal trial as social ritual, in addition to defining the
present community, defines the community through time. An ad-
versary criminal trial is a democratic rite connecting modem people
to the founders and the ideals of human freedom that they articu-
lated. The rights that shape and structure the criminal trial invest it
with a special type of ceremony and confirm in it a distinctly Ameri-
can complex of conceptions and ideals about the relationship be-
tween government and the people. In effect, certain American
ideals, beliefs and understandings of the way the world should and
does operate interact and resonate harmonically with trial form to
confirm both our way of operating criminal trials and our identity as
Americans.
To develop these ideas, it is necessary to examine the American
adversary criminal trial system to see how it comprises a ritual and
how it confirms or generates values and maintains ideals. Of the
theories of adversary criminal trial considered, only the norm theory
emphasizes the central role of the jury in trial structure. In the truth
finding theory, the jury is a liability; in the fair decision theory, the
jury is a putative protection from judicial bias; in the rights theory,
the jury represents one of a number of defendants' trial rights. The
jury is central to the norm theory, however, because only a body
taken from a cross sectional representative group of the community
can meaningfully project community norms. In this view, the crimi-
nal trial jury is the principal force in shaping and maintaining the
structure of the criminal trial, because the jury represents the com-
munity, both symbolically and actually, and brings community con-
sciousness, community values and culture into the trial system. The
jury is also a focal point of trial as a communal ritual. Thus, the best
way to explore and develop the norm theory and to answer the criti-
cisms raised earlier is to examine criminal trials from the point of
view of the jury.
IX. A JURY'S VIEW OF CRIMINAL TRIAL
The ancient Greek word for trial is agon, a word that better than
any modern words captures within its multiple meanings the
unique, complex and rich character of criminal jury trials as human
events. Agon means a gathering or assembly, a contest or struggle, a
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dramatic conflict between chief characters in a play.63 For the trial
jury, as well as for other trial participants, a criminal trial is all of
these: drama, spectacle, performance, competition, community
meeting and decisional forum.
These features of trials, which I call "agonic resonances", are
greatly underplayed in explanations of adversary criminal trial. Eve-
ryone knows they exist, but these features do not fit easily with stan-
dard purposive explanations and are generally ignored as simply
coincidental similarities between criminal trial and certain other
human activities. 64 On the other hand, one could contend that
these features are culturally fundamental to the American criminal
trial system and help to explain its particular forms.
Legally trained individuals quickly grow accustomed to the for-
mal shape of adversary trials and forget how strange, yet familiar,
trial proceedings appear to lay persons. The proceedings are partic-
ularly strange to jury members who become deeply involved in
them, first as involuntary participants, then as spectators of a special
kind, and finally as decision-makers. Consider, for example, the mis
en scene, or stage production, values in adversary criminal trial. The
trial takes place in a special arena, which generally is undecorated,
clean, and often furnished in rich wood panelling and severe furni-
ture. This setting conveys the austerely dignified effect of a sacred
precinct, a kind of civic temple reserved for the rites of a civic reli-
gion. Indeed, the focal arrangements of furniture and seating in
many trial courtrooms are reminiscent of those in churches, with the
bench andjurybox replacing the altar and choirbox, and the specta-
tor benches replacing the pews. The proceedings have strong ele-
ments of formalized ritual. They open in great formality and
continue in a highly formal and structured manner. A robed and
honored official, the judge, usually assisted by a bailiff, begins the
event and supervises its course through several distinct stages. A
court reporter meticulously records every word, thus giving them a
virtually sacral character.
The principal actors, the judge, the lawyers and the court offi-
cials, have formally set roles and set places on the stage. In interact-
ing with one another, these role players use special language and
stock phrases. They also move in accordance with a set of formal
rules, respecting one another's space and moving from one territory
63 N. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (P. Gove ed. 1981).
64 Arnold is one exception. T. ARNOLD, supra note 53. Arnold views a criminal trial
as an event filled with drama and symbolism, and he brings these features of criminal
trial forward in his discussion.
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to another with notice given to and permission received from the
judge. The jurors, for the most part, are passive participants at
these proceedings; initially, they are cast as a small audience. The
jury is given little direct information about the formalities of the
proceedings, the structure of the trial or the limits of their role.
What they do learn of these matters, they learn indirectly through
the process by means of the imbedded cues of ritual, authority,
space, position, place, tone and the directions and modelling of the
principal actors. From time to time, the judge, in formal and unfa-
miliar language, instructs the jurors on how to treat various matters
they see and hear. All of these impressions and overt directions
teach the jurors that they are witnesses to, and ultimately judges of,
a very special event.
These ritualistic aspects of an adversary jury trial are important.
Ritual stems from and creates identifiable feelings and attitudes, and
it imprints solemnity, propriety, regularity and formal rightness on
events, occasions and proceedings. Participation in ritual is also a
way of acknowledging, or accepting, membership in the community
that uses the ritual. Depending on its forms, ritual may also invoke
and symbolically enact some community value or ideal. Engaging in
ritual both expresses and creates community; it is a way of partici-
pating, sharing, binding and confirming.
The ritual features of an adversary jury trial are entwined with
its dramaturgical and contest features. In addition to being a ritual
event, a criminal trial is a kind of drama or morality play, as well as a
competition. Within the framework set by trial formalities, etiquette
and evidentiary rules, the jurors watch a show, produced and di-
rected by the lawyers, who are also the principal actors. The show is
staged as a competition between two parties regarding the correct
version of past events and the accused's responsibility for them.
The lawyers remain on stage throughout the trial, playing their
parts and directing the gradual and detailed unfolding of stories of
past events by serially bringing forward other actors to advance the
stories.
The drama presented is unusual and has elements both of the
rehearsed and the extemporaneous, as though it were simultane-
ously a scripted play and a spontaneous happening. The characters
are real and are both directed and unrehearsed. The trial action
takes place in the present, but it is about the past. As a play, the trial
has as its plot the contest between two different stories, the differ-
ence generally turning on different alleged factual versions of un-
derlying events. What turns the factual versions into different
stories is the way the elements are linked to frame a moral. This
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moral is broadly conceived by the prosecution as a norm violation
and by the defense as either not a norm violation, as an excused or
justified violation, or as a lesser violation than what was alleged.
Whatever specific plot surfaces in a particular trial, all trial plots
have as their unstated subtext the opposition between the govern-
ment and an individual. In this subtext, the government has two
possible roles: the role of legitimate law enforcer and the role of
oppressor of freedoms. The defendant is also cast in the ambivalent
roles of a criminal, a deviant, or a potentially oppressed individual.
At the conclusion of the trial, both stories, as well as the implicit
subtext, are proferred in formal equipoise to the jury for judgment
as to who has won the contest, accuser or accused. The jury is for-
mally free to accept or reject either story or to compose its own
story from the materials of the factual versions presented. The jury
does not have to report which story it chose, but it must agree unan-
imously on its judgment. In effect, the jury concludes the plot of the
play by either condemning the defendant or rejecting the accusa-
tion, thereby giving the drama a moral. The jury therefore ex-
presses a communal moral judgment on the inseparable sum total of
the drama it has witnessed. In reaching its judgment, the jury also
reads the subtext of the drama and implicitly decides which roles the
principal players occupied.
The manner in which the jury reaches its judgment, however, is
as important as the judgment itself. Consider, for example, that
trial juries in ancient Greece rendered a communal judgment by in-
dividual voting, without discussion or deliberation, following the
trial proceedings.6 5 This "communal" judgment is similar to what
we see in athletic competitions, for example, where individual
judges rate performances. Such judgments are communal in the
sense that they represent the sum of individual and mutually unin-
fluenced reactions of community members.
Our criminal juries, however, come to judgment after delibera-
tion under circumstances in which the jurors must reach a super-
majority consensus of views, either unanimity or near unanimity, in
order to render an acceptable verdict. In this situation, unlike that
of simple, undeliberated voting, the jurors' act of judging is an ef-
fort to reach a common understanding about the meaning, in terms
of possible criminal liability, of what they have seen and heard. The
65 D. MACDOWELL, THE LAw IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 251-52 (1978). Athenian jurors
may not have deliberated, but they certainly represented the community in another
sense. Their size was large in comparison to modern juries; in the fourth century, B.C.,
juries of 500 were common. There is also evidence of cases being tried by as many as
6,000 jurors. Id. at 36, 40.
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communal judgment of our juries is not the sum of individual views,
but a negotiated settlement of views.
Each juror comes to this deliberative meeting with a completely
personal and unique set of impressions, attitudes and interpreta-
tions of what he or she has seen and heard. Each juror is an unique
individual with education, training and life experiences which differ
from those of the other jurors. The potential for disparity of view-
points is virtually guaranteed by the present interpretation of the
constitutional representative jury requirement and its proscription
on excluding members of cognizable groups from the venire. 66 Fur-
thermore, criminal trial rules prohibit the jurors from discussing the
case with anyone, including fellow jurors, prior to the time the case
is sent to the jury for deliberations. 67 Thus, at the start of jury de-
liberations there are likely to be many different views of the meaning
of the events which the jurors have witnessed. In order to come to a
common agreement, the jurors will have to engage in a cooperative
process of interpretation and come to a common understanding by
negotiating a common definition of the situation that was presented
to them. To accomplish this task, the jurors must at least implicitly
accept a common set of criteria of evaluation and then make similar
assessments.
This necessary process in jury deliberations is also an omni-
present feature of American society, both as a matter of American
political ideology and fact. American society is highly heterogene-
ous and is composed of people from many different races, cultures
and ethnic groups, who hold many different philosophies of life. In
order for this polyglot polity to function, the frictional differences
between people, which may be quite serious, must somehow be
worked through in all matters requiring accord for common action.
One ideal American model for such decision-making is a direct de-
mocracy in which group decisions about what to do in uncertain sit-
uations are made following a discussion permitting the development
of a true consensus.
Consensual decisions in heterogenous societies or groups pre-
suppose mutual adjustments of views. In regard to juries, this ad-
justment means that jury decisions may not embody the norms of
any affiliation groups to which the members of the jury belong but,
instead, will reflect either norms common or generic to all of those
groups or compromise norms that are acceptable to everyone. It is
66 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).




in this sense that the criminal trial jury can be said to express a com-
munal judgment: it either applies existing generic norms or makes
new generic norms and applies them. Thejury is, therefore, expres-
sive of the larger community in generic norm application and consti-
tutive of community in generic norm creation.
The criminal trial jury is an example of a cultural paradigm of
community decision-making. Because this kind of decision-making
is at the core of American beliefs about democracy and ideological
commitments to democracy, jury decisions are culturally validated.
Since a conviction is a community judgment mediated by the jury
about a factually and attributionally uncertain situation, it defines
the community's moral assessment of that situation. That definition
sets a norm or standard for future similar situations. In other
words, convictions implicitly produce referential norms.
In celebrated or controversial cases, jury verdicts may directly
broadcast norms either to the community at large, to smaller com-
munities or interest groups concerned with the substance of the
trial, or both. Cases such as the recent insider trading cases68 gen-
erate enormous publicity, which effectively carries normative
messages of these cases well beyond the inner circle of criminal law
professionals. Indeed, such criminal trials often become a focus for
public consciousness on both the specific normative issues raised by
the trial and on criminal justice and law enforcement matters in gen-
eral. 69 In most criminal cases, however, a conviction is not a norm
which is broadcast at large to the community, because the commu-
nity does not know enough about it to draw any conclusion regard-
ing its normative meaning. The trial participants, however, can
draw such conclusions. In an ongoing system of criminal trials, it is
the repeat players in the system, the lawyers and the judges, who are
able to draw the normative lessons that jury convictions imply.
They develop a feel for what juries are likely to do in many of the
innumerable situations designated for criminal justice system reso-
lution and also develop some skill in translating old normative les-
sons to new situations. The adversary criminal trial system in a
given jurisdiction develops a local culture regarding what the rele-
vant community will and will not tolerate.
The trial lawyers, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, use
68 The indictments of Michael David and Dennis Levine for insider trading sent
shock waves through the Wall Street financial and legal communities and apparently
have led to many changes in practices. Herzel and Katz, Insider Trading Cases, The L. A.
DailyJ.,June 26, 1986, at 4, col. 3; Galen, Security More Crucial Than Ever, The Nat'l LJ.,
June 30, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
69 T. ARNOLD, supra note 53, at 147.
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their knowledge of local culture to evaluate cases and to determine
whether they are triable. Essentially, it is the defense that deter-
mines whether or not a case is tried because, generally, only the
defense can force a trial. A case is triable for the defense if it clearly
raises an unresolved normative point, if it has significant factual in-
determinacies or if there is nothing to lose by going to trial.
Although in theory the structure of adversary criminal trial
gives both the prosecution and the defense bargaining power and
makes trial results unpredictable, in reality the local normative cul-
ture, as developed over time through convictions, considerably
reduces this unpredictability. Practitioners develop the ability to
evaluate and grade situations according to probable findings of
criminal liability. In effect, convictions set the standards by which
other cases are judged and graded. Practitioners, in assessing and
negotiating settlements in other cases, spread the normative
messages convictions convey throughout the criminal justice system.
"Truth-finding" is an ideal in this system, and, as an ideal, it is sym-
bolically important for its norm-production value. Therefore, the
norms created are valid as they relate to stories presented, and ju-
ries must believe that some construction of the information
presented to them represents the true state of affairs. The ritual
features of criminal trials insure that the jurors and everyone else
will take the trials seriously. It is beside the point that jurors may
come to believe something other than what actually happened, as
long as their error is in the direction of acquittal, which is structur-
ally guaranteed by the defendant's trial rights and the adversary
ethos.
Jury decision is a key element in the public acceptance of crimi-
nal trial decisions. Thejury represents the community, and the trial
and deliberative processes make the jury a decisional community
with a special authority. Assuming that a criminal trial is conducted
properly, society may assume that the prosecution's case has been
severely tested. When ajury convicts, society may also assume that
the defendant is guilty and that his conviction represents a referen-
tial norm expressive of community sentiment in similar cases.
X. CONCLUSION
The essential criminal trial need is to generate decisions in a
manner and with results that the community can accept and use.
Criminal trial decisions will be accepted if they are arrived at
through a process which itself conforms to fundamental, dominant
social beliefs and attitudes. Among those beliefs are certain deep
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suspicions about the inevitable oppressive tendencies of govern-
ment and official decision-making, a deep concern about making
mistakes in matters involving life or liberty, and a confidence, or
democratic belief, in the ability of citizens to come to wise commu-
nal decisions and govern themselves. "The law fulfills its functions
best when it represents the maximum of competing symbols,"' 70 and
American beliefs and attitudes, which sometimes conflict, are struc-
turally and symbolically realized in criminal trials through the de-
fendant's trial rights. These rights were adopted by our founders as
essential to liberty. In our fidelity to these rights and, perhaps, in
our development of them in the direction of liberty beyond what the
founders conceived, we show that we are as committed to liberty as
the founders were and affirm, or confirm, each individual's identity
as a member of the American polity. 71
70 T. ARNOLD, supra note 53, at 147.
71 The following case arose in 1967 in West New Britain, New Guinea. I place it here
on the margin as an example of a "fact-finding trial" in another culture. I leave it to the
reader to draw the parallels.
Bruno, Manu's only son, aged twelve years, became ill and died. The symptoms of
his illness were running, ulcerated sores in his mouth and throat, a posture of some kind
of seizure, great pain and high temperature. His death was highly unusual, and every-
one knew it was caused by sorcery.
Speculation centered around the three village sorcerers, but finally settled on
Panga. In the villagers' minds, these facts singled him out as a sorcerer and perpetrator.
He was not a native of the village, but an outsider who had married a native and moved
to the village. In this village, sorcerers by definition were outsiders.
Panga had the qualities of a sorcerer. He lied, he was greedy, selfish, pretentious
and bullying. In general, he was neither liked nor trusted.
Panga had a motive. Bruno's father, Manu, had led a group of men who had once
driven Panga from the village. As Bruno was an only son, killing him would have been
effective revenge against Manu.
Panga knew sorcery, had a relative who had been a sorcerer, had been jailed for
threatening sorcery, and bragged that he knew how to make poison. Shortly before
Bruno's death, villagers saw Panga perform a ritual.
While the villagers suspected Panga, they did not believe there was enough proof of
guilt to take vengeance. While he could have killed the boy with poisoned food, he did
not admit it, was not seen in a position to have done it, and had never before been
suspected of using sorcery against a villager. The villagers believed that one killed by
sorcery knows his killer and that his ghost can, through a proper divination ritual, tell
the living who it was. This was held, as follows:
After dark, a bamboo pole decorated with aromatic herbs and pig mandibles
was carried to Bruno's grave. Bruno was awakened, as were the spirits of his de-
ceased kinsmen, and they were carried in the pole to Bruno's home where a bowl of
food had been placed inside the house. A hole was made in the wall of the house,
the doors of the house were locked, and the pole containing the spirits was thrust
into the house near the bowl of food. Bruno was instructed to eat, and after a few
minutes, as ritually prescribed, his maternal cross-cousin spoke to him by asking
him to identify his killer. The cousin then began calling out the names of Kaliai
people, village by village, while the pole was rhythmically moved into and out of the
hole. The pole began moving more and more rapidly when the questioner reached
Kandoka, and at the question did your father's mouth eat you?' the pole was jerked
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into the house and held fast, resisting the efforts of some twenty five men to pull it
out.
At this point, the ritual was halted in order to interpret the meaning of the
spirit. Speeches were made asserting that, obviously, Bruno did not mean that he
had been killed by a direct act of his father. Instead, his death was the indirect
result of his father's hot temper and quarrelsome ways. Bruno was saying that he
had been killed as an act of vengeance by someone who had been offended by
Manu. When the content of the speeches indicated that agreement had been
reached on the interpretation of Bruno's message, the divination was resumed, this
time to discover the village home of the killer .... As the naming neared Panga's
house, the pole moved increasingly faster.
At this point, the diviner broke off the divination, explaining he had seen Bruno's
kinsmen carrying weapons. He feared they would kill whoever was named as the mur-
derer and was worried about what the government would do about that killing. None-
theless, while the trial was aborted, its most likely result is evident: Panga would have
been named the murder of the sorcerer, a judgment all the villagers would readily have
accepted. Counts, The Kaliai Lupunga: Disputing in the Public Forum in CONTENTION AND
DISPUTE, 113, 135 n.141 (A.L. Epstein ed.).
